Swarm SDK

Defense

Post-quantum encrypted communications for drone swarms and counter-drone systems

Drop-in Python SDK with gossip mesh routing (no single point of failure), MAVLink v2 transport (fits 253-byte payloads), Double Ratchet forward secrecy, and ML-KEM-768 post-quantum key exchange. Private keys never leave the drone. v0.4.0 adds situational awareness, EW coordination, adversarial resilience, and RF fingerprinting. 465 tests. Python 3.9–3.13.

ML-KEM-768Double RatchetMAVLink v2Gossip MeshSender KeysDeniable AuthEd25519CNSA 2.0Situational AwarenessEW CoordinationRF Tracking465 Tests

The Encryption Gap in Drone Swarms

The DoD is deploying thousands of autonomous drones under Replicator, CCA, and SOCOM programs — and spending $3.1B in FY2026 on counter-drone systems. Both sides share the same problem: encryption doesn't scale to expendable systems.

  • NSA Type 1 encryption costs $100K+ per unit and takes 2–3 years to certify
  • Expendable drone swarms cost $5K each — the crypto costs more than the drone
  • MANET radios (Silvus, Persistent) run $5K–$30K/node with proprietary waveforms
  • Counter-drone interceptor fleets need encrypted C2 between networked effectors — no integrated solution exists
  • New NSS acquisitions must be post-quantum compliant by January 1, 2027 (CNSA 2.0)

The Swarm SDK is software-only encrypted comms at near-zero marginal cost per node — whether that node is an offensive drone, a counter-drone interceptor, or a networked effector turret. Post-quantum today. MAVLink-native. No hardware dependency.

Swarm SDK vs Alternatives

E2E Encrypted
Swarm
Type 1
MANET
OSS
~
Post-Quantum (ML-KEM-768)
Swarm
Type 1
MANET
OSS
MAVLink v2 Native
Swarm
Type 1
MANET
OSS
Forward Secrecy (per-message)
Swarm
Type 1
MANET
OSS
Mesh Routing (no SPOF)
Swarm
Type 1
MANET
~
OSS
~
Software-Only (~$0/drone)
Swarm
Type 1
MANET
OSS
Deniable Authentication
Swarm
Type 1
MANET
OSS
Situational Awareness
Swarm
Type 1
MANET
OSS
EW Task Coordination
Swarm
Type 1
MANET
~
OSS
RF Fingerprinting
Swarm
Type 1
MANET
OSS
Deploy in Minutes
Swarm
Type 1
MANET
OSS
~

Type 1/HAIPE = NSA-certified hardware encryptors ($100K+/unit). MANET = Silvus, Persistent Systems, L3Harris ($5K–$30K/node). OSS = research/academic crypto libraries.

Quick Start

Join a swarm, send encrypted, receive — in a few lines of Python.

Install
pip install -e ".[postquantum,mavlink]"   # Full install with PQ + MAVLink
Encrypted Swarm in 10 Lines
import asyncio
from swarm_sdk import SwarmAgent, UDPTransport, CryptoEngine

async def main():
    swarm_key = CryptoEngine.generate_swarm_key()

    drone1 = SwarmAgent(name="drone-1", transport=UDPTransport(port=5600), swarm_key=swarm_key)
    drone2 = SwarmAgent(name="drone-2", transport=UDPTransport(port=5601), swarm_key=swarm_key)

    await drone1.join()
    await drone2.join()

    # Encrypted broadcast to all swarm members
    await drone1.broadcast(b'{"cmd": "waypoint", "lat": 37.7749, "lon": -122.4194}')

    # Receive and decrypt
    msg = await drone2.recv(timeout=5.0)
    print(f"From {msg.sender_name}: {msg.plaintext}")

    await drone1.leave()
    await drone2.leave()

asyncio.run(main())
Double Ratchet (Forward Secrecy)
# Per-message keys — capture a drone,
# past messages stay encrypted
await drone1.send_ratchet(
    drone2.identity.did,
    b'targeting data'
)

msg = await drone2.recv()
# msg.signature_valid = True
# msg.msg_type = "unicast"
swarm-sdk v0.4.0

Python 3.9–3.13. PyNaCl (libsodium), optional pymavlink + liboqs. 465 tests. GitHub Actions CI.

Proprietary License

Available to defense contractors and government partners via direct delivery. Contact info@ai-analytics.org for access.

MAVLink v2 Ready

PX4, ArduPilot, MAVSDK compatible. Auto-fragmentation to 253-byte payloads. ~128 bytes usable plaintext.

Core Capabilities

Not just encryption — a complete swarm communication stack from crypto to transport.

Broadcast Encryption

10K+ ops/sec

XSalsa20-Poly1305 symmetric encryption with shared swarm key. PKCS7 padding hides message length. Ed25519 signatures authenticate sender. 10,000+ encrypt/decrypt ops per second.

await drone.broadcast(b'{"cmd": "RTL"}')

Gossip Mesh Routing

fanout=3, TTL=5

Peer-to-peer with no central coordinator. Fanout of 3, TTL of 5 hops, 50K message dedup window. 2-second heartbeats detect lost drones within 10 seconds. Mesh self-heals around node loss.

mesh = MeshRouter(identity, transport, ttl=5)

Double Ratchet

~125 µs/op

Signal-spec forward secrecy. HKDF-SHA256 chain ratchet derives per-message keys. DH ratchet provides post-compromise recovery. Capture a drone today, past and future messages stay encrypted.

await drone.send_ratchet(peer_did, targeting_data)

MAVLink Transport

253B packets

Native MAVLink v2 adapter for PX4, ArduPilot, MAVSDK. Auto-fragments messages into 253-byte ENCAPSULATED_DATA packets. 5-second reassembly timeout. ~128 bytes usable plaintext per packet.

transport = MAVLinkTransport("udpin:0.0.0.0:14550")

Post-Quantum Hybrid

FIPS 203

ML-KEM-768 (NIST FIPS 203) + X25519 hybrid key exchange. Both classical and quantum-resistant algorithms must be broken to compromise a session. CNSA 2.0 compliant. Ships today.

agent = SwarmAgent(name="pq-drone", pq_enabled=True)

Deniable Authentication

HMAC-SHA256

HMAC-SHA256 with shared DH secret replaces Ed25519 signatures. Both parties can produce the same MAC — plausible deniability for sensitive operations. Wire format FLAG_DENIABLE (step 0x04).

await drone.send_deniable(peer_did, b"covert ops")

Sender Keys (Group Ratchet)

O(1) encrypt

Signal Sender Keys protocol for O(1) multicast. Each member creates a chain key, encrypts once for the group. Per-message forward secrecy via chain ratchet. Handles packet loss with bounded skip-ahead.

await drone.send_group("squad-1", target_dids, data)

Sealed Sender

sender-anon

Ephemeral X25519 keypair hides sender identity from network observers. Only the recipient learns who sent the message. Each message uses a fresh keypair — completely unlinkable.

await drone.send_sealed(peer_did, b"anonymous tip")

Session Management

secure wipe

Programmatic control over Double Ratchet sessions. List, inspect, and securely destroy sessions. Reset overwrites key material with zeros before GC. Auto-reinitializes on next send.

drone.reset_session(peer_did) # zeros key material

Reliable Send (ACK + Retransmit)

3 retries

Encrypted unicast with delivery confirmation. Automatic retransmission with exponential backoff (5s → 10s → 20s, max 3 retries). Background asyncio loop handles retransmit. on_ack and on_timeout callbacks.

msg_id = await drone.send_reliable(peer_did, data)

X3DH Prekey Management

auto-refresh

Full lifecycle for one-time prekeys. Generate bundles, consume on session init, auto-refresh when count drops below threshold. Non-colliding IDs across refreshes. Prevents OTP exhaustion in high-churn swarms.

drone.setup_prekeys(num=10) # auto-refreshes at 3

Group Epoch Rekeying

forward secrecy

Remove a member and rekey the group with a fresh chain key. Old key overwritten with zeros. New epoch distributed via encrypted unicast to remaining members. Evicted member loses all future access.

await drone.rekey_group("squad-1", remaining_dids)

X3DH Session Establishment

async handshake

Signal-spec X3DH key agreement wired into SwarmAgent. Asynchronous session init from prekey bundles — message offline drones, establish Double Ratchet on first contact. Signed prekey verification prevents MitM.

await drone.init_session_x3dh(peer_did, prekey_bundle)

Full-Path Replay Protection

4 decrypt paths

SHA-256 message dedup across all decrypt paths: standard, sealed sender, deniable, and group. 10K-message bounded window with O(1) eviction. Prevents replay attacks on every protocol mode.

# automatic — all decrypt paths check dedup window

Situational Awareness (SWA)

8 threat types

Real-time peer classification (friendly / unknown / suspect / hostile) with behavior-based reputation scoring. Detects 8 threat types: Sybil clusters, RSSI anomalies, rate floods, replays, rogue announces, session anomalies, invalid signatures, and unknown swarm encounters. Auto-quarantines hostile nodes — quarantined peers excluded from mesh gossip fanout. Reputation time-decay prevents permanent blacklisting; inactive peers recover toward neutral. Exports mesh topology as networkx-compatible graph.

drone.swa.get_peer(peer_did).classification # → HOSTILE

Electronic Warfare Coordination

5 EW modes

Coordinates EW operations across the swarm: 5 modes (JAM, SPOOF, LISTEN, DECEPTIVE, SCAN). Full task lifecycle (pending → active → completed/aborted). Wire format with 0x4557 magic bytes. Spectrum awareness sharing and coordinated timing via mesh consensus. The SDK coordinates which nodes do what, when — hardware does the RF.

ew.create_task(mode=EWMode.JAM, target=target)

Adversarial Resilience

4-stage escalation

Active defense against crypto and RF attacks. Per-peer rate limiting with 4-stage escalation (ALLOW → THROTTLE → DROP → QUARANTINE). Cryptographic canaries detect MitM tampering. Decryption failure tracking triggers emergency key rotation. Auto-quarantine release with exponential backoff (5 min → 1 hour max). All thresholds configurable via ExtensionConfig (20 validated parameters).

action = resilience.check_incoming(peer_did) # → QUARANTINE

RF Fingerprinting & Tracking

multilateration

Passive tracking using RSSI time-series, multilateration from 3+ observers for position estimates, and movement prediction from signal trends. Communication pattern fingerprinting classifies drone types (ArduPilot, PX4, DJI, custom). No extra hardware — analyzes signals already received by the mesh router.

pos = tracker.estimate_position(target_did) # → Position2D

Architecture

Application Layer (waypoints, telemetry, targeting, ISR)
     |
     v
Swarm SDK
  +-- CryptoEngine    ML-KEM-768 + X25519 + XSalsa20 + Double Ratchet + Sender Keys
  +-- MeshRouter      Gossip routing, peer discovery, dedup, ACK delivery
  +-- Identity        DID:swarm (W3C DID 1.0), credential management
  +-- SwarmAgent      Public API: join/leave/broadcast/send/send_group/recv
     |
     v
Transport Adapters
  +-- MAVLinkTransport   PX4 / ArduPilot / MAVSDK (253B packets)
  +-- UDPTransport       UDP multicast (WiFi mesh, LTE, satellite)
  +-- Custom             LoRa, HF radio, any IP transport
     |
     v
Radio / Network Hardware
1
Install

pip install with PyNaCl (libsodium). Optional: pymavlink for autopilot transport, liboqs for post-quantum ML-KEM-768. Ed25519 signing + X25519 encryption keypairs generated locally.

2
Join Swarm

Drone generates a self-certifying did:swarm: identity, announces to peers via gossip flood. Proof-of-possession (Ed25519 signature) prevents MitM identity injection. Peer table builds automatically.

3
Encrypt & Send

Seven modes: broadcast, unicast, Double Ratchet, sealed sender, deniable, Sender Keys group ratchet, and PQ hybrid. PKCS7 padding hides message length. Ed25519 or deniable HMAC authentication.

4
Route & Receive

Gossip mesh routes ciphertext via bounded fanout (3 peers). 50K dedup window prevents storm loops. Receiver decrypts, verifies signature, checks replay window. Message delivered to application callback or recv() queue.

Defense Use Cases

Offensive swarms, counter-drone networks, and everything in between.

Offensive Swarm Operations

Replicator Expendable Swarms

Sub-$5K drones coordinating in denied environments. Software-only encryption at near-zero marginal cost per drone. Fits inside MAVLink v2 payloads for PX4/ArduPilot autopilots.

await swarm.broadcast(b'{"cmd": "engage", "grid": "NK-4521"}')

CCA Manned-Unmanned Teaming

Drone wingmen sharing targeting data with pilot aircraft. Double Ratchet ensures compromising one key cannot decrypt past/future messages. Gossip mesh means no C2 single point of failure.

await wingman.send_ratchet(pilot_did, targeting_data)

Multi-Domain Swarm Mesh

Air, sea, ground assets sharing C2 data across domains. Gossip routing with 3-peer fanout and 5-hop TTL. Self-certifying DIDs eliminate PKI dependency. JADC2 / ORIENT compatible.

await node.send_multicast(coalition_dids, c2_update)

Sender Keys Group Encryption

O(1) group encryption with per-message forward secrecy. Each drone encrypts once for the whole squad. Chain ratchet destroys old keys after each message. Handles packet loss with bounded skip-ahead.

await drone.send_group("squad-1", squad_dids, c2_data)
Counter-UAS & Base Defense

C-UAS Interceptor Fleet

Networked drone interceptors (DroneHunter, Anvil, Roadrunner) need encrypted coordination to engage swarm threats. Broadcast encrypted engagement commands to the entire fleet. Gossip mesh means losing an interceptor does not break the kill chain.

await fleet.broadcast(b'{"cmd": "engage", "threat_id": "T-042"}')

Networked Effector Coordination

Multi-turret arrays sharing firing solutions and threat tracks. Encrypted C2 between autonomous turrets, laser dazzlers, and RF jammers. JIATF-401 CSO explicitly seeks platform-agnostic C2 integration for counter-drone effectors.

await turret.send_ratchet(c2_did, fire_solution)

C-UAS Sensor Mesh

Distributed radar, RF, and EO/IR sensors sharing encrypted detection data. Multicast threat tracks to subscribed effectors. Ed25519 signatures ensure sensor data is tamper-evident. Mesh routing eliminates sensor-to-C2 single point of failure.

await sensor.send_multicast(effector_dids, threat_track)

Installation & Event Protection

Fixed-site counter-drone for bases, airports, FIFA World Cup venues, and critical infrastructure. DHS is spending $365M on C-UAS for 2026 events. Swarm SDK secures the C2 layer between detection and response.

await cuas.broadcast(b'{"alert": "group1_uas", "sector": "NE"}')
Cross-Cutting

ISR Sensor Fusion

Distributed surveillance drones sharing encrypted sensor data. Multicast to subgroups. Ed25519 signatures create tamper-evident evidence chains. 10K+ ops/sec handles high-rate telemetry streams.

await isr.broadcast(b'{"type": "detection", "conf": 0.94}')

Post-Quantum Migration

CNSA 2.0 requires PQ compliance by January 2027. Swarm SDK ships ML-KEM-768 + X25519 hybrid today. Government PQC migration estimated at $7.1B through 2035. Drop-in upgrade for existing systems.

agent = SwarmAgent(name="pq", pq_enabled=True) # Done.
v0.4.0 Extension Modules

Swarm Encounter Detection

SWA detects foreign swarms approaching, classifies unknown nodes via behavior analysis, and auto-quarantines hostiles. Reputation scoring tracks trust over time. Mesh topology export produces networkx-compatible graphs for C2 visualization.

encounters = swa.detect_foreign_swarms() # unknown DIDs

Coordinated Electronic Warfare

EW coordinator distributes jam/spoof/listen/deceptive/scan tasks across the swarm with priority-based assignment. Synchronized timing via mesh consensus ensures coordinated operations. Spectrum awareness data shared in real-time across all nodes.

await ew.coordinate(targets, timing="mesh_sync")

Active Threat Mitigation

Resilience module rate-limits suspicious peers with automatic escalation. Deploys cryptographic canaries to detect MitM tampering in the mesh. Triggers emergency key rotation when compromise indicators are detected. Integrates with SWA for unified threat response.

resilience.deploy_canary(swarm_key) # MitM detection

Passive RF Intelligence

RF tracker builds position estimates from RSSI observations across 3+ drones using multilateration. Classifies drone types (ArduPilot, PX4, DJI, custom) by communication pattern fingerprinting. No additional sensors or hardware required.

pattern = tracker.fingerprint(target_did) # drone type

Cryptographic Architecture

Key Exchange
ML-KEM-768 + X25519 hybrid (NIST FIPS 203 + RFC 7748)
Forward Secrecy
Double Ratchet (DH + HMAC-SHA256 chain) — per-message keys
Post-Quantum
ML-KEM-768 encapsulation — harvest-now-decrypt-later resistant
Encryption
XSalsa20-Poly1305 (NaCl secretbox, 128-bit authenticated)
Signatures
Ed25519 (RFC 8032) or deniable HMAC-SHA256
Key Derivation
HKDF-SHA256 (RFC 5869) with domain separation
Identity
did:swarm:{base58} — self-certifying, W3C DID 1.0
Message Padding
PKCS7 (32-byte blocks) hides message length
Replay Protection
10K message ID dedup window, O(1) eviction — covers all decrypt paths (standard, sealed, deniable, group)
Protocol Header
[0x56][flags][step] — 6 flags: PQ, RATCHET, PAD, SEAL, DH, DENIABLE
Wire Overhead
107 bytes standard, 147 bytes with Double Ratchet
MAVLink Fit
~128 bytes usable plaintext per 253-byte packet (with padding)

Performance

Symmetric Encrypt/Decrypt
10,000–12,000 ops/sec (XSalsa20-Poly1305)
Asymmetric Encrypt/Decrypt
8,000–10,000 ops/sec (X25519 + NaCl)
Double Ratchet
6,000–8,000 ops/sec (~125 µs/op)
Serialization
15,000–20,000 ops/sec (binary wire format)
22-byte Telemetry
139 bytes encrypted (107B overhead + PKCS7 padding) — fits MAVLink
200-byte Command
331 bytes encrypted (with padding) — 2 MAVLink fragments
Mesh Dedup Window
50,000 message IDs, O(1) eviction
Peer Discovery
< 2 seconds (heartbeat interval)
Lost Drone Detection
< 10 seconds (5x heartbeat timeout)

Compliance Roadmap

ML-KEM-768 (FIPS 203)
Implemented·Shipping today
Ed25519 / X25519 (RFC 8032 / 7748)
Implemented·Shipping today
CNSA 2.0 Hybrid (PQ + Classical)
Implemented·Shipping today
FIPS 140-3
Planned·12–18 months
CMMC Level 2
Planned·6–12 months
NSA CSfC Listing
Target·18–24 months

FIPS 140-2 goes fully historical September 21, 2026. Average FIPS 140-3 validation: 542 days. Early start is critical.

Engagement Model

Phase I — SBIR/AFWERX ($75K–$180K, 3–6 months): PoC on target autopilot platform. Encrypted swarm demo on customer hardware.
Phase II — Prototype ($1.25M–$1.8M, 12 months): Program integration. FIPS 140-3 initiated. Field testing in operational environment.
Phase III — Production (Unlimited, sole-source eligible): Full deployment. CSfC listing pursuit. Volume licensing across programs.
Enterprise License: Annual subscription per deployment. No per-drone cost. Unlimited swarm size.
New 2026: SBIR Strategic Breakthrough Awards — up to $30M per award, 48-month periods.

Frequently Asked Questions

Release timeline

  1. v0.4

    Situational Awareness, EW Coordination, Adversarial Resilience, RF Fingerprinting & Tracking. 163 new tests (465 total).

  2. v0.3

    Sender Keys for O(1) group encryption. Sealed Sender. Deniable HMAC mode. PKCS7 padding across all transports.

  3. v0.2

    MAVLink v2 transport adapter. PX4 / ArduPilot / MAVSDK compatibility. Message fragmentation and reassembly inside 253-byte payloads.

  4. v0.1

    Initial release. Gossip mesh routing, Double Ratchet forward secrecy, ML-KEM-768 + X25519 hybrid post-quantum key exchange.

Ai Analytics LLC · info@ai-analytics.org · Proprietary — defense contractors and government partners only.