Swarm SDK
DefensePost-quantum encrypted communications for drone swarms and counter-drone systems
Drop-in Python SDK with gossip mesh routing (no single point of failure), MAVLink v2 transport (fits 253-byte payloads), Double Ratchet forward secrecy, and ML-KEM-768 post-quantum key exchange. Private keys never leave the drone. v0.4.0 adds situational awareness, EW coordination, adversarial resilience, and RF fingerprinting. 465 tests. Python 3.9–3.13.
The Encryption Gap in Drone Swarms
The DoD is deploying thousands of autonomous drones under Replicator, CCA, and SOCOM programs — and spending $3.1B in FY2026 on counter-drone systems. Both sides share the same problem: encryption doesn't scale to expendable systems.
- •NSA Type 1 encryption costs $100K+ per unit and takes 2–3 years to certify
- •Expendable drone swarms cost $5K each — the crypto costs more than the drone
- •MANET radios (Silvus, Persistent) run $5K–$30K/node with proprietary waveforms
- •Counter-drone interceptor fleets need encrypted C2 between networked effectors — no integrated solution exists
- •New NSS acquisitions must be post-quantum compliant by January 1, 2027 (CNSA 2.0)
The Swarm SDK is software-only encrypted comms at near-zero marginal cost per node — whether that node is an offensive drone, a counter-drone interceptor, or a networked effector turret. Post-quantum today. MAVLink-native. No hardware dependency.
Swarm SDK vs Alternatives
| Capability | Swarm SDK | Type 1 / HAIPE | MANET Radio | Open Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| E2E Encrypted | ✓ | ✓ | — | ~ |
| Post-Quantum (ML-KEM-768) | ✓ | — | — | — |
| MAVLink v2 Native | ✓ | — | — | — |
| Forward Secrecy (per-message) | ✓ | — | — | — |
| Mesh Routing (no SPOF) | ✓ | — | ~ | ~ |
| Software-Only (~$0/drone) | ✓ | — | — | ✓ |
| Deniable Authentication | ✓ | — | — | — |
| Situational Awareness | ✓ | — | — | — |
| EW Task Coordination | ✓ | — | ~ | — |
| RF Fingerprinting | ✓ | — | — | — |
| Deploy in Minutes | ✓ | — | — | ~ |
Type 1/HAIPE = NSA-certified hardware encryptors ($100K+/unit). MANET = Silvus, Persistent Systems, L3Harris ($5K–$30K/node). OSS = research/academic crypto libraries.
Quick Start
Join a swarm, send encrypted, receive — in a few lines of Python.
pip install -e ".[postquantum,mavlink]" # Full install with PQ + MAVLink
import asyncio
from swarm_sdk import SwarmAgent, UDPTransport, CryptoEngine
async def main():
swarm_key = CryptoEngine.generate_swarm_key()
drone1 = SwarmAgent(name="drone-1", transport=UDPTransport(port=5600), swarm_key=swarm_key)
drone2 = SwarmAgent(name="drone-2", transport=UDPTransport(port=5601), swarm_key=swarm_key)
await drone1.join()
await drone2.join()
# Encrypted broadcast to all swarm members
await drone1.broadcast(b'{"cmd": "waypoint", "lat": 37.7749, "lon": -122.4194}')
# Receive and decrypt
msg = await drone2.recv(timeout=5.0)
print(f"From {msg.sender_name}: {msg.plaintext}")
await drone1.leave()
await drone2.leave()
asyncio.run(main())# Per-message keys — capture a drone,
# past messages stay encrypted
await drone1.send_ratchet(
drone2.identity.did,
b'targeting data'
)
msg = await drone2.recv()
# msg.signature_valid = True
# msg.msg_type = "unicast"swarm-sdk v0.4.0Python 3.9–3.13. PyNaCl (libsodium), optional pymavlink + liboqs. 465 tests. GitHub Actions CI.
Proprietary LicenseAvailable to defense contractors and government partners via direct delivery. Contact info@ai-analytics.org for access.
MAVLink v2 ReadyPX4, ArduPilot, MAVSDK compatible. Auto-fragmentation to 253-byte payloads. ~128 bytes usable plaintext.
Core Capabilities
Not just encryption — a complete swarm communication stack from crypto to transport.
Broadcast Encryption
10K+ ops/secXSalsa20-Poly1305 symmetric encryption with shared swarm key. PKCS7 padding hides message length. Ed25519 signatures authenticate sender. 10,000+ encrypt/decrypt ops per second.
await drone.broadcast(b'{"cmd": "RTL"}')Gossip Mesh Routing
fanout=3, TTL=5Peer-to-peer with no central coordinator. Fanout of 3, TTL of 5 hops, 50K message dedup window. 2-second heartbeats detect lost drones within 10 seconds. Mesh self-heals around node loss.
mesh = MeshRouter(identity, transport, ttl=5)Double Ratchet
~125 µs/opSignal-spec forward secrecy. HKDF-SHA256 chain ratchet derives per-message keys. DH ratchet provides post-compromise recovery. Capture a drone today, past and future messages stay encrypted.
await drone.send_ratchet(peer_did, targeting_data)MAVLink Transport
253B packetsNative MAVLink v2 adapter for PX4, ArduPilot, MAVSDK. Auto-fragments messages into 253-byte ENCAPSULATED_DATA packets. 5-second reassembly timeout. ~128 bytes usable plaintext per packet.
transport = MAVLinkTransport("udpin:0.0.0.0:14550")Post-Quantum Hybrid
FIPS 203ML-KEM-768 (NIST FIPS 203) + X25519 hybrid key exchange. Both classical and quantum-resistant algorithms must be broken to compromise a session. CNSA 2.0 compliant. Ships today.
agent = SwarmAgent(name="pq-drone", pq_enabled=True)Deniable Authentication
HMAC-SHA256HMAC-SHA256 with shared DH secret replaces Ed25519 signatures. Both parties can produce the same MAC — plausible deniability for sensitive operations. Wire format FLAG_DENIABLE (step 0x04).
await drone.send_deniable(peer_did, b"covert ops")Sender Keys (Group Ratchet)
O(1) encryptSignal Sender Keys protocol for O(1) multicast. Each member creates a chain key, encrypts once for the group. Per-message forward secrecy via chain ratchet. Handles packet loss with bounded skip-ahead.
await drone.send_group("squad-1", target_dids, data)Sealed Sender
sender-anonEphemeral X25519 keypair hides sender identity from network observers. Only the recipient learns who sent the message. Each message uses a fresh keypair — completely unlinkable.
await drone.send_sealed(peer_did, b"anonymous tip")Session Management
secure wipeProgrammatic control over Double Ratchet sessions. List, inspect, and securely destroy sessions. Reset overwrites key material with zeros before GC. Auto-reinitializes on next send.
drone.reset_session(peer_did) # zeros key materialReliable Send (ACK + Retransmit)
3 retriesEncrypted unicast with delivery confirmation. Automatic retransmission with exponential backoff (5s → 10s → 20s, max 3 retries). Background asyncio loop handles retransmit. on_ack and on_timeout callbacks.
msg_id = await drone.send_reliable(peer_did, data)X3DH Prekey Management
auto-refreshFull lifecycle for one-time prekeys. Generate bundles, consume on session init, auto-refresh when count drops below threshold. Non-colliding IDs across refreshes. Prevents OTP exhaustion in high-churn swarms.
drone.setup_prekeys(num=10) # auto-refreshes at 3Group Epoch Rekeying
forward secrecyRemove a member and rekey the group with a fresh chain key. Old key overwritten with zeros. New epoch distributed via encrypted unicast to remaining members. Evicted member loses all future access.
await drone.rekey_group("squad-1", remaining_dids)X3DH Session Establishment
async handshakeSignal-spec X3DH key agreement wired into SwarmAgent. Asynchronous session init from prekey bundles — message offline drones, establish Double Ratchet on first contact. Signed prekey verification prevents MitM.
await drone.init_session_x3dh(peer_did, prekey_bundle)Full-Path Replay Protection
4 decrypt pathsSHA-256 message dedup across all decrypt paths: standard, sealed sender, deniable, and group. 10K-message bounded window with O(1) eviction. Prevents replay attacks on every protocol mode.
# automatic — all decrypt paths check dedup windowSituational Awareness (SWA)
8 threat typesReal-time peer classification (friendly / unknown / suspect / hostile) with behavior-based reputation scoring. Detects 8 threat types: Sybil clusters, RSSI anomalies, rate floods, replays, rogue announces, session anomalies, invalid signatures, and unknown swarm encounters. Auto-quarantines hostile nodes — quarantined peers excluded from mesh gossip fanout. Reputation time-decay prevents permanent blacklisting; inactive peers recover toward neutral. Exports mesh topology as networkx-compatible graph.
drone.swa.get_peer(peer_did).classification # → HOSTILEElectronic Warfare Coordination
5 EW modesCoordinates EW operations across the swarm: 5 modes (JAM, SPOOF, LISTEN, DECEPTIVE, SCAN). Full task lifecycle (pending → active → completed/aborted). Wire format with 0x4557 magic bytes. Spectrum awareness sharing and coordinated timing via mesh consensus. The SDK coordinates which nodes do what, when — hardware does the RF.
ew.create_task(mode=EWMode.JAM, target=target)Adversarial Resilience
4-stage escalationActive defense against crypto and RF attacks. Per-peer rate limiting with 4-stage escalation (ALLOW → THROTTLE → DROP → QUARANTINE). Cryptographic canaries detect MitM tampering. Decryption failure tracking triggers emergency key rotation. Auto-quarantine release with exponential backoff (5 min → 1 hour max). All thresholds configurable via ExtensionConfig (20 validated parameters).
action = resilience.check_incoming(peer_did) # → QUARANTINERF Fingerprinting & Tracking
multilaterationPassive tracking using RSSI time-series, multilateration from 3+ observers for position estimates, and movement prediction from signal trends. Communication pattern fingerprinting classifies drone types (ArduPilot, PX4, DJI, custom). No extra hardware — analyzes signals already received by the mesh router.
pos = tracker.estimate_position(target_did) # → Position2DArchitecture
Application Layer (waypoints, telemetry, targeting, ISR)
|
v
Swarm SDK
+-- CryptoEngine ML-KEM-768 + X25519 + XSalsa20 + Double Ratchet + Sender Keys
+-- MeshRouter Gossip routing, peer discovery, dedup, ACK delivery
+-- Identity DID:swarm (W3C DID 1.0), credential management
+-- SwarmAgent Public API: join/leave/broadcast/send/send_group/recv
|
v
Transport Adapters
+-- MAVLinkTransport PX4 / ArduPilot / MAVSDK (253B packets)
+-- UDPTransport UDP multicast (WiFi mesh, LTE, satellite)
+-- Custom LoRa, HF radio, any IP transport
|
v
Radio / Network Hardwarepip install with PyNaCl (libsodium). Optional: pymavlink for autopilot transport, liboqs for post-quantum ML-KEM-768. Ed25519 signing + X25519 encryption keypairs generated locally.
Drone generates a self-certifying did:swarm: identity, announces to peers via gossip flood. Proof-of-possession (Ed25519 signature) prevents MitM identity injection. Peer table builds automatically.
Seven modes: broadcast, unicast, Double Ratchet, sealed sender, deniable, Sender Keys group ratchet, and PQ hybrid. PKCS7 padding hides message length. Ed25519 or deniable HMAC authentication.
Gossip mesh routes ciphertext via bounded fanout (3 peers). 50K dedup window prevents storm loops. Receiver decrypts, verifies signature, checks replay window. Message delivered to application callback or recv() queue.
Defense Use Cases
Offensive swarms, counter-drone networks, and everything in between.
Replicator Expendable Swarms
Sub-$5K drones coordinating in denied environments. Software-only encryption at near-zero marginal cost per drone. Fits inside MAVLink v2 payloads for PX4/ArduPilot autopilots.
await swarm.broadcast(b'{"cmd": "engage", "grid": "NK-4521"}')CCA Manned-Unmanned Teaming
Drone wingmen sharing targeting data with pilot aircraft. Double Ratchet ensures compromising one key cannot decrypt past/future messages. Gossip mesh means no C2 single point of failure.
await wingman.send_ratchet(pilot_did, targeting_data)Multi-Domain Swarm Mesh
Air, sea, ground assets sharing C2 data across domains. Gossip routing with 3-peer fanout and 5-hop TTL. Self-certifying DIDs eliminate PKI dependency. JADC2 / ORIENT compatible.
await node.send_multicast(coalition_dids, c2_update)Sender Keys Group Encryption
O(1) group encryption with per-message forward secrecy. Each drone encrypts once for the whole squad. Chain ratchet destroys old keys after each message. Handles packet loss with bounded skip-ahead.
await drone.send_group("squad-1", squad_dids, c2_data)C-UAS Interceptor Fleet
Networked drone interceptors (DroneHunter, Anvil, Roadrunner) need encrypted coordination to engage swarm threats. Broadcast encrypted engagement commands to the entire fleet. Gossip mesh means losing an interceptor does not break the kill chain.
await fleet.broadcast(b'{"cmd": "engage", "threat_id": "T-042"}')Networked Effector Coordination
Multi-turret arrays sharing firing solutions and threat tracks. Encrypted C2 between autonomous turrets, laser dazzlers, and RF jammers. JIATF-401 CSO explicitly seeks platform-agnostic C2 integration for counter-drone effectors.
await turret.send_ratchet(c2_did, fire_solution)C-UAS Sensor Mesh
Distributed radar, RF, and EO/IR sensors sharing encrypted detection data. Multicast threat tracks to subscribed effectors. Ed25519 signatures ensure sensor data is tamper-evident. Mesh routing eliminates sensor-to-C2 single point of failure.
await sensor.send_multicast(effector_dids, threat_track)Installation & Event Protection
Fixed-site counter-drone for bases, airports, FIFA World Cup venues, and critical infrastructure. DHS is spending $365M on C-UAS for 2026 events. Swarm SDK secures the C2 layer between detection and response.
await cuas.broadcast(b'{"alert": "group1_uas", "sector": "NE"}')ISR Sensor Fusion
Distributed surveillance drones sharing encrypted sensor data. Multicast to subgroups. Ed25519 signatures create tamper-evident evidence chains. 10K+ ops/sec handles high-rate telemetry streams.
await isr.broadcast(b'{"type": "detection", "conf": 0.94}')Post-Quantum Migration
CNSA 2.0 requires PQ compliance by January 2027. Swarm SDK ships ML-KEM-768 + X25519 hybrid today. Government PQC migration estimated at $7.1B through 2035. Drop-in upgrade for existing systems.
agent = SwarmAgent(name="pq", pq_enabled=True) # Done.Swarm Encounter Detection
SWA detects foreign swarms approaching, classifies unknown nodes via behavior analysis, and auto-quarantines hostiles. Reputation scoring tracks trust over time. Mesh topology export produces networkx-compatible graphs for C2 visualization.
encounters = swa.detect_foreign_swarms() # unknown DIDsCoordinated Electronic Warfare
EW coordinator distributes jam/spoof/listen/deceptive/scan tasks across the swarm with priority-based assignment. Synchronized timing via mesh consensus ensures coordinated operations. Spectrum awareness data shared in real-time across all nodes.
await ew.coordinate(targets, timing="mesh_sync")Active Threat Mitigation
Resilience module rate-limits suspicious peers with automatic escalation. Deploys cryptographic canaries to detect MitM tampering in the mesh. Triggers emergency key rotation when compromise indicators are detected. Integrates with SWA for unified threat response.
resilience.deploy_canary(swarm_key) # MitM detectionPassive RF Intelligence
RF tracker builds position estimates from RSSI observations across 3+ drones using multilateration. Classifies drone types (ArduPilot, PX4, DJI, custom) by communication pattern fingerprinting. No additional sensors or hardware required.
pattern = tracker.fingerprint(target_did) # drone typeCryptographic Architecture
Performance
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Symmetric Encrypt/Decrypt | 10,000–12,000 ops/sec (XSalsa20-Poly1305) |
| Asymmetric Encrypt/Decrypt | 8,000–10,000 ops/sec (X25519 + NaCl) |
| Double Ratchet | 6,000–8,000 ops/sec (~125 µs/op) |
| Serialization | 15,000–20,000 ops/sec (binary wire format) |
| 22-byte Telemetry | 139 bytes encrypted (107B overhead + PKCS7 padding) — fits MAVLink |
| 200-byte Command | 331 bytes encrypted (with padding) — 2 MAVLink fragments |
| Mesh Dedup Window | 50,000 message IDs, O(1) eviction |
| Peer Discovery | < 2 seconds (heartbeat interval) |
| Lost Drone Detection | < 10 seconds (5x heartbeat timeout) |
Compliance Roadmap
| Certification | Status | Timeline |
|---|---|---|
| ML-KEM-768 (FIPS 203) | Implemented | Shipping today |
| Ed25519 / X25519 (RFC 8032 / 7748) | Implemented | Shipping today |
| CNSA 2.0 Hybrid (PQ + Classical) | Implemented | Shipping today |
| FIPS 140-3 | Planned | 12–18 months |
| CMMC Level 2 | Planned | 6–12 months |
| NSA CSfC Listing | Target | 18–24 months |
FIPS 140-2 goes fully historical September 21, 2026. Average FIPS 140-3 validation: 542 days. Early start is critical.
Engagement Model
Frequently Asked Questions
Release timeline
- v0.4
Situational Awareness, EW Coordination, Adversarial Resilience, RF Fingerprinting & Tracking. 163 new tests (465 total).
- v0.3
Sender Keys for O(1) group encryption. Sealed Sender. Deniable HMAC mode. PKCS7 padding across all transports.
- v0.2
MAVLink v2 transport adapter. PX4 / ArduPilot / MAVSDK compatibility. Message fragmentation and reassembly inside 253-byte payloads.
- v0.1
Initial release. Gossip mesh routing, Double Ratchet forward secrecy, ML-KEM-768 + X25519 hybrid post-quantum key exchange.
Ai Analytics LLC · info@ai-analytics.org · Proprietary — defense contractors and government partners only.